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We consider the problem of locating facilities in a metric
space to serve a set of selfish agents. The cost of an agent
is the distance between her own location and the nearest fa-
cility. The social cost is the total cost of the agents. We are
interested in designing strategy-proof mechanisms without
payment that have a small approximation ratio for social
cost. A mechanism is a (possibly randomized) algorithm
which maps the locations reported by the agents to the lo-
cations of the facilities. A mechanism is strategy-proof if
no agent can benefit from misreporting her location in any
configuration.
This setting was first studied by Procaccia and Tennen-
holtz [21]. They focused on the facility game where agents
and facilities are located on the real line. Alon et al. stud-
ied the mechanisms for the facility games in a general metric
space [1]. However, they focused on the games with only one
facility. In this paper, we study the two-facility game in a
general metric space, which extends both previous models.
We first prove an Ω(n) lower bound of the social cost
approximation ratio for deterministic strategy-proof mech-
anisms. Our lower bound even holds for the line metric
space. This significantly improves the previous constant
lower bounds [21, 17]. Notice that there is a matching linear
upper bound in the line metric space [21]. Next, we provide
the first randomized strategy-proof mechanism with a con-
stant approximation ratio of 4. Our mechanism works in
general metric spaces. For randomized strategy-proof mech-
anisms, the previous best upper bound is O(n) which works
only in the line metric space.
∗This work was done when the two authors were visiting
Microsoft Research Asia.
†Partially supported by the National Innovation Research
Project for Undergraduates (NIRPU) of $180.
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for
personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are
not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies
bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to
republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific
permission and/or a fee.
EC’10, June 7–11, 2010, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA.
Copyright 2010 ACM 978-1-60558-822-3/10/06 ...$10.00.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
F.2 [Theory of Computation]: Analysis of Algorithms
and Problem Complexity; J.4 [Computer Applications]:




Game theory, Algorithmic mechanism design, Social choice,
Strategy-proof
1. INTRODUCTION
We start with a typical problem in economics: the gov-
ernment plans to build several libraries in a city to serve a
local community. All residents report their home addresses
so that the government can decide the most appropriate li-
brary locations. Every resident wants to be as close to one of
the libraries as possible; meanwhile, the government wants
to minimize the sum of distances between each resident and
her nearest library, which is called the social cost. In many
cases, the government cannot trust the self-reported ad-
dresses from residents, because people are selfish, and could
report false addresses for personal benefits.
This type of problem is called the facility game. In this
game, agents report their locations and accordingly a mech-
anism chooses positions to build facilities. A mechanism is
also called a social choice function in the Economics litera-
ture. Specifically, agents and facilities are located in some
metric space. To model real problems, the distance func-
tion could be the Euclidean distance, the shortest path dis-
tance (in a graph), or any other metric. An agent may
misreport her location if she can reduce her own cost. To
avoid such misreport, the strategy-proofness is introduced in
game theory, which is the main focus of this paper. In a
strategy-proof mechanism, no agent can unilaterally benefit
from misreporting. A stronger requirement is called group
strategy-proofness. In a group strategy-proof mechanism, no
group of agents can misreport their locations such that each
member can strictly benefit. Formal definitions of the these
concepts are given in Section 2.
The facility game has a rich history in social science lit-
eratures. There has been some partial characterizations of
the strategy-proof mechanisms for some metric spaces, e.g.
a facility on a line [6, 19, 4, 25] or on a general network [23].
However, these works have not considered the optimizations
or approximations over the social cost.
The study of algorithmic aspect of mechanism design prob-
lem was initiated by the seminal work of Nisan and Ro-
nen [20] in 1999. During the past decade, a significant body
of work has been done for optimization problems from a
mechanism design point of view [15, 2, 10, 14]. Most of the
work deals with mechanisms which employ payment. In par-
ticular, the well known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mech-
anism [26, 8, 12] is strategy-proof, which gives an optimal
solution for our facility game if payment is allowed.
However, in many social choice settings, monetary trans-
fer may be unavailable due to legal or ethical issues as noted
by Schummer and Vohra [24]. Voting is one perfect example.
More recently, Procaccia and Tennenholtz formally initiated
the study of approximate mechanism design without money
in their seminal paper [21]. This type of work can also be
traced back to the work on incentive compatible learning by
Dekel et al. [9]. From a more algorithmic viewpoint, Procac-
cia and Tennenholtz studied strategy-proof mechanisms that
give provable approximation ratios on social cost. A mecha-
nism is called γ-approximate, if for every input instance, the
social cost for the outcome is no more than γ times that of
an optimal assignment. We are interested in studying both
upper and lower bounds of the approximation ratios for pos-
sibly randomized strategy-proof mechanisms. We note that
here the lower bound is due to the cost of strategy-proofness
rather than the computational complexity. Same type of
lower bounds were proved for mechanisms (with payment)
for scheduling unrelated machines [7, 13, 18, 16].
For the two-facility game on a line, Procaccia and Tennen-
holtz [21] gave an upper bound of n−2 and a lower bound of
1.5 for deterministic strategy-proof mechanisms. The lower
bound was later improved to 2 [17]. In addition, Lu, Wang
and Zhou [17] obtained an upper bound of n/2 and a lower
bound of 1.045 for randomized strategy-proof mechanisms.
To close the huge gaps for both deterministic and random-
ized cases is an important open problem in this direction.
Our work resolves this problem by proving asymptotically
tight bounds for both cases.
Besides, Alon et al. [1] studied the facility game in a gen-
eral metric space rather than a line. They gave an almost
complete characterization of the feasible strategy-proof ap-
proximation ratios, but under the condition that there is
solely one facility. In this paper, we analyze the game with
two facilities, and prove our results in any general metric
space. Notice that this generalization is non-trivial and our
work is a joint extension of the work by Procaccia and Ten-
nenholtz [21] and the work by Alon et al. [1].
1.1 Our Results
We study the approximation ratios of strategy-proof mech-
anisms for two-facility games in generalmetric spaces. It is
the first time that facility games with more than one facility
are considered in general metric spaces. We obtain three
main results.
Our first result is a linear lower bound of the approxima-
tion ratio for deterministic strategy-proof mechanisms. This
is noticeably the first super constant lower bound for the
two-facility game, and even holds in the line metric space.
It confirms one conjecture in [21]. Moreover, the proof idea
is new, and we highlight two key concepts we employ and
may be of independent interest.
• Partial group strategy-proofness. In a partial group
strategy-proof mechanism, a group of agents at the
same location cannot benefit even if they misreport
their locations simultaneously. As noted in [21], there
is a lower bound of Ω(n) for group strategy-proof mech-
anisms of the two-facility game. However, a strategy-
proof mechanism may not be group strategy-proof.
To overcome such obstacle, we introduce the concept
of partial group strategy-proofness and prove that it
can be implied from the strategy-proofness. Our lower
bound is benefited from this observation.
• Image set 1. This is defined as the set of possible fa-
cility locations when a group of agents varies their re-
ported locations within the entire space, fixing the lo-
cations of other agents. This concept allows an inves-
tigation of infinite number of location profiles simulta-
neously, while previous lower bounds are obtained by
analyzing only constant many profiles.
We remark here that the above two concepts are defined for
general facility games in an arbitrary metric space.
Our second result is a randomized strategy-proof mecha-
nism with a constant approximation ratio for the two-facility
game, working in general metric spaces. In comparison, the
previous best known upper bound is O(n) and works only
in the line metric space. Together with our first result, this
mechanism indicates that randomness is indeed an essen-
tial power in (money-less) strategy-proof mechanism design.
This new mechanism is very intuitive. The first facility is
allocated uniformly over all reported locations; the second
facility is assigned to another reported location with prob-
ability proportional to its distance to the first facility. We
call it the Proportional Mechanism. Although the mecha-
nism seems natural, the proof of its strategy-proofness and
the analysis of its approximation ratio are both involved.
Our third result is a deterministic mechanism with an
O(n) approximation ratio for the circle metric space. A
circle is S1 ⊂ R2, and the distance of two points on S1 is
the length of the minor arc between them. This is noticeably
the first bounded deterministic mechanism for two-facility
games over metric spaces other than the line. It is also worth
pointing out that this mechanism is group strategy-proof.
We summarize our results and the state of the art in the
following table.
Deterministic Randomized





(2 [17]) LB : (1.045 [17])
Circle UB : n− 1 (N/A) UB : 4 (N/A)
LB : n−1
2
(2 [17]) LB : (1.045 [17])
General UB : N/A UB : 4 (N/A)
LB : n−1
2
(2 [17]) LB : (1.045 [17])
Table 1: Our results are in bold. The expressions in
brackets are previous results (N/A means no previ-
ous known bound).
We recall that even for the line metric space, the previous
best upper and lower bounds are O(n) and Ω(1) respectively,
1An anonymous reviewer pointed out that a similar idea is
used in [5].
in both deterministic and randomized settings. This work
significantly improves our understanding of: 1) the power of
(money-less) strategy-proof mechanism for facility games;
2) the power of randomness in (money-less) strategy-proof
mechanism design.
1.2 Related Work
The facility game problem has a rich history in social sci-
ence literatures. Consider the case that we are building one
facility in a discrete set of locations (alternatives). Agents
are reporting their preferences for the alternatives. The
renowned Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem [11, 22] showed
that if the preferences on the alternatives for agents are arbi-
trary, the only strategy-proof mechanism is the dictatorship
when the number of alternatives are greater than two.
In real life, agent preferences on the locations are not ar-
bitrary. In particular for the facility game over a real line,
agents should have single-peaked preferences, where peaks
are at agents’ own locations. This kind of admissible pref-
erence was first discussed by Black [6]. Later, Moulin [19],
Barberà and Jakson [4], and Sprumont [25] characterized
the class of all strategy-proof mechanisms for the one-facility
game in the real line. Interested readers may refer to the de-
tailed survey by Barberà [3]. Notably, the characterization
for the strategy-proof mechanisms with two or more facilities
(even over a line) is wide open.
In additional to the social cost, Procaccia and Tennen-
holtz [21] and Alon et al. [1] also considered another opti-
mization target, the maximum cost. They obtained lower
and upper bounds for the approximation ratios of strategy-
proof mechanisms for this target. Another extension of the
facility games was studied in [21] and [17]. In this game,
an agent may have more than one location and is aiming to
minimize the overall cost of all the locations she have.
2. PRELIMINARIES
Let (Ω, d) be a metric space where d : Ω × Ω → R is the
metric. The distance between any two points x, y ∈ Ω is
d(x, y). Recall that for all x ∈ Ω, d(x, x) = 0.
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of agents. The location
reported by agent i is xi ∈ Ω. We denote x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn)
a location profile.
In the k-facility game, a deterministic mechanism outputs
k facility locations according to a given location profile x,
and thus is a function f : Ωn → Ωk. Assuming the set of
facility locations to be f(x) = {l1, l2, ...lk}, the cost of agent
i is her distance to the nearest facility:
cost(f(x), xi) = min
j=1,··· ,k
{d(lj , xi)}.
A randomized mechanism is a function f : Ωn → ∆(Ωk),
where ∆(Ωk) is the set of distributions over Ωk. The cost of
agent i is now her expected cost over such distribution:







Let x−i = (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn) be the location pro-
file without agent i. We write x = ⟨xi,x−i⟩. Similarly, when
S ⊂ N is a set of agents, we denote x−S the location profile
of agents outside S. We write x = ⟨xS ,x−S⟩, the location
profile satisfying that agents in S report locations xS while
other agents report locations x−S . For simplicity, we denote
f(xi,x−i) = f(⟨xi,x−i⟩) and f(xS ,x−S) = f(⟨xS ,x−S⟩).
The social cost of a mechanism f on a location profile x





We note that in the randomized case, this social cost is an
expected value. For a location profile x, denote OPT(x)
the optimal social cost. We say that a mechanism f has an
approximation ratio γ, if for all profile x ∈ Ωn,
SC(f,x) ≤ γOPT(x).
In this paper, we stick to the case of k = 2 which we
name it the two-facility game. Besides the general metric
space, we also study two special cases: the line metric space
and the circle metric space. The line metric is simply the
Euclidean metric on the real line; the circle metric is defined
as the length of the minor arc between any two points on
S1 ⊂ R2. Our definitions of line and circle are consistent
with that in [1].
Now, we give formal definitions of strategy-proofness and
group strategy-proofness.
Definition 2.1. A mechanism is strategy-proof if no agent
can benefit from misreporting her location. Formally, given
agent i, profile x = ⟨xi,x−i⟩ ∈ Ωn, and a misreported loca-
tion x′i ∈ Ω, it holds that
cost(f(xi,x−i), xi) ≤ cost(f(x′i,x−i), xi).
Definition 2.2. 2 A mechanism is group strategy-proof
if for any group of agents, at least one of them cannot benefit
if they misreport simultaneously.
Formally, given a non-empty set S ⊂ N , profile x =
⟨xS ,x−S⟩ ∈ Ωn, and the misreported locations x′S ∈ Ω|S|,
there exists i ∈ S, satisfying
cost(f(xS ,x−S), xi) ≤ cost(f(x′S ,x−S), xi).
2.1 Partial Group Strategy-Proofness
Inspired by the group strategy-proofness, we define the
partial group strategy-proofness:
Definition 2.3. A mechanism is partial group strategy-
proof if for any group of agents at the same location, each
individual cannot benefit if they misreport simultaneously.
Formally, given a non-empty set S ⊂ N , profile x =
⟨xS ,x−S⟩ ∈ Ωn where xS = (x, ..., x) for some x ∈ Ω, and
the misreported locations x′S ∈ Ω|S|, we have:
cost(f(xS ,x−S), x) ≤ cost(f(x′S ,x−S), x)
Intuitively, the definition says that a group of overlapping
agents cannot “group-misreport” and benefit. By definition,
we have the following:
group strategy-proofness
⇒ partial group strategy-proofness
⇒ strategy-proofness.
In the following, we show that one reversal direction also
holds:
2Here we use the weak notion of group strategy-proofness
which follows the definitions in [21, 1]. Some other work
defines the strong group strategy-proofness by asking that
it cannot be the case that all the deviating agents do not
lose and at least one strictly gains.
Lemma 2.1. In a k-facility game, a strategy-proof mech-
anism is also partial group strategy-proof.
Proof. We embrace the same notations as in Definition
2.3. In addition, we let S = {s1, s2, . . . , sl}, and x′si be
the misreported location for agent si in x
′
S . Consider the
following sequence of profiles :
Pi(0 ≤ i ≤ l) : sj reports x for 1 ≤ j ≤ i;
sj reports x
′
si for i < j ≤ l;
other agents report x−S .
By definition, we have
cost(f(P0), x) = cost(f((x, ..., x),x−S), x)
and
cost(f(Pl), x) = cost(f(x
′
S ,x−S), x).
We are to prove that cost(f(P0), x) ≤ cost(f(Pl), x).
In profile Pi where 1 ≤ i ≤ l, agent si is at location x. We
consider the scenario that agent si misreports to x
′
si , and
this is exactly Pi−1. By the strategy-proofness of f , agent
si cannot benefit from this misreport: cost(f(Pi), x)) ≤
cost(f(Pi−1), x). Summing up these inequalities for all i =
1, 2, ..., l, we complete the proof.
We remark that our lower bound result in the next section
will be proved with the aid of the notion of partial group
strategy-proofness. The definition of partial group strategy-
proof is not restricted to the two-facility game; or rather it
also works for k-facility games for any k. This fact may be
of independent interest.
3. LINEAR LOWER BOUND FOR DETER-
MINISTIC MECHANISMS
In this section, we give a linear lower bound of n−1
2
on the
approximation ratio for deterministic strategy-proof mech-
anisms. This bound is constructed in the line metric space,
which naturally extends to other more general metric spaces.
The previous known lower bounds are only constants [21,
17].
For the two-facility game on the real line, choosing the
leftmost and the rightmost points in the location profile is a
deterministic strategy-proof mechanism with an approxima-
tion ratio of n− 2 [21]. Therefore, our lower bound implies
that this simple mechanism is asymptotically optimal.
3.1 Image Set
We first explore some properties of the k-facility game.
These properties will be used for our two-facility case, but
may be of independent interest for further studies.
We define the concept of image set. For a given mechanism
f , the image set of agent i with respect to a location profile
x−i is the set of all possible facility locations when agent i
varies her reported location:
Ii(x−i) = ∪xi∈Ωf(xi,x−i).
The following lemma states that a strategy-proof mecha-
nism f always outputs some location in Ii(x−i) that is clos-
est to agent i. Intuitively, the image set represents agent i’s
power. If f outputs the best solution for agent i within her
power, agent i does not have the incentive to lie.
Lemma 3.1. Let f be a strategy-proof mechanism for the
k-facility game, ⟨xi,x−i⟩ ∈ Ωn. We have:
cost(f(xi,x−i), xi) = inf
y∈Ii(x−i)
d(y, xi).
Proof. We assume for contradiction that there exists
y∗ ∈ Ii(x−i) such that d(y∗, xi) < cost(f(xi,x−i), xi).
By the definition of image set, there exists x∗i satisfying
y∗ ∈ f(x∗i ,x−i). Consider the scenario that agent i is at
xi. She can misreport to x
∗
i , experiencing a lower cost of
d(y∗, xi) than her current cost of cost(f(xi,x−i), xi). This
contradicts the assumption that f is strategy-proof.
This lemma implies that if an agent misreports to one
of the current facilities, this facility will stay at the same
location. Formally, we have:
Corollary 3.2. Let f be a strategy-proof mechanism for
the k-facility game. Let x = ⟨xi,x−i⟩ be a location profile.
If z ∈ f(x), we must have z ∈ f(z,x−i).
Proof. By the definition of image set, z ∈ Ii(x−i) be-
cause z ∈ f(x) = f(xi,x−i). According to Lemma 3.1,
cost(f(z,x−i), z) = infy∈Ii(x−i) d(y, z). But the right hand
side is 0 since z ∈ Ii(x−i). This implies z ∈ f(z,x−i).
The following result is another direct corollary of Lemma
3.1.
Corollary 3.3. Let Ii(x−i) be an image set of a strategy-
proof mechanism for the k-facility game in metric space (Ω, d).
Then Ii(x−i) is a closed set of Ω under the topology induced
by the metric d(·).
Now we extend the definition of image set from single
agent to the multi agent. Given mechanism f , we define the





Using partial group strategy-proofness, Lemma 3.1, Corol-
lary 3.2 and Corollary 3.3 have the corresponding multi-
agent counterparts.
Lemma 3.4 (Extending 3.1). Let f be a strategy-proof
mechanism for the k-facility game. Let S ⊂ N be a non-
empty set of agents, xS = (x, ..., x), and x−S ∈ Ωn−|S|. We
have:
cost(f(xS ,x−S), x) = inf
y∈JS(x−S)
d(y, x).
Proof. Assume the statement is false, there exists y∗ ∈
JS(x−S) such that d(y
∗, x) < cost(f(xS ,x−S), x).
By the definition of image set, there exists x′S satisfying
y∗ ∈ f(x′S ,x−S). By the partial group strategy-proofness
(Lemma 2.1) of f , agents in S for profile ⟨xS ,x−S⟩ cannot
“group-misreport” to x′S and benefit. Therefore, we have
cost(f(xS ,x−S), x) ≤ cost(f(x′S ,x−S), x) ≤ d(y∗, xi),
resulting in a contradiction.
Similarly, we have the following two corollaries.
Corollary 3.5 (Extending 3.2). Let f be a strategy-
proof mechanism for the k-facility game. Let S ⊂ N be a
set of agents, and x−S ∈ Ωn−|S|, we have:
∀x ∈ JS(x−S), x ∈ f((x, ..., x),x−S).
Corollary 3.6 (Extending 3.3). JS(x−S) is closed
in Ω.
3.2 Proof of the Lower Bound
In this section we state and prove our main lower bound
theorem.
Theorem 3.7. Any deterministic strategy-proof mecha-
nism for the two-facility game in the line metric space has
an approximation ratio of at least n−1
2
.
Our lower bound is obtained by a careful study of the
behavior of any mechanism on the following set of profiles
x(a, b) = (a, a, . . . , a︸ ︷︷ ︸
(n−1)/2
, b, b, . . . , b︸ ︷︷ ︸
(n−1)/2
, 1),
where a ≤ b ≤ 1 are two parameters. Intuitively, when
a = −1 and b = 0, a mechanism with a good approximation
ratio should allocate one facility near a and the other facility
near b; when the distance between a and b is very small, it
should allocate one facility near a (and hence b) and the
other near 1. However, we will show that a strategy-proof
mechanism cannot do well in both cases.
We notice that in x(a, b), n−1
2
agents are at a same lo-
cation a and another n−1
2
agents are at a same location
b. This configuration enables us to adopt the partial group
strategy-proofness.
Let Sa (resp. Sb) be the
n−1
2
agents at location a (resp. b).
Then x−Sa (resp. x−Sb) is the location profile that agents
in Sb (resp. Sa) report b (resp. a) and the last agent reports
1. We define:
Ia(b) = JSa(x−Sa) = JSa((b, ..., b, 1));
Ib(a) = JSb(x−Sb) = JSb((a, ..., a, 1)).
Lemma 3.8. Let f be a deterministic strategy-proof mech-
anism for a line metric space with an approximation ratio
smaller than n−1
2
. Then a ∈ f(x(a, b)) for all a ≤ b ≤ 1.
Proof. The lemma is obvious when b = 1. Consider Ia(b)
for b < 1. We first show that Ia(b) ∩ (−∞, b) = (−∞, b),
by assuming for contradiction that there exists some c < b








Figure 1: The definition of c, a∗ and a∗ + ϵ
Notice that when a → −∞, any mechanism with a bounded
approximation ratio will place a facility close to a and hence
on the left side of c. This indicates that Ia(b)∩ (−∞, c) ̸= ∅.
Therefore a∗ = supx∈Ia(b){x < c} is well defined. Since Ia(b)
is closed according to Corollary 3.6, we have a∗ ∈ Ia(b).
Now we have a∗ < c < b, as shown in Figure 1. According
to definitions above, we have (a∗, c] ∩ Ia(b) = ∅. For any
0 ≤ ϵ < (c− a∗)/2, the closest point to a∗ + ϵ in the image
set Ia(b) is a∗ (this point is unique). Thus by Lemma 3.4,





x′ = (a∗ + ϵ, a∗ + ϵ, . . . , a∗ + ϵ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(n−1)/2
, b, b, . . . , b︸ ︷︷ ︸
(n−1)/2
, a∗).
Using the fact that a∗ ∈ f(x(a∗ + ϵ, b)) and Corollary 3.2,
we know a∗ ∈ f(x′). However, no matter where the second
facility is placed by f , the social cost is at least (n−1)ϵ
2
. This
contradicts that f has an approximation ratio smaller than
(n−1)/2, because the optimal social cost in profile x′ is only
ϵ. In sum, we must have Ia(b) ∩ (−∞, b) = (−∞, b).
Finally, using Corollary 3.5, it is clear that for any a < b,
a ∈ f(x(a, b)). For the case of a = b the result is trivial.
Using analogous techniques we can prove the following
lemma, whose proof can be found in the appendix.
Lemma 3.9. Let f be a deterministic strategy-proof mech-
anism for the line metric space with an approximation ratio
smaller than n−1
2
. We have b ∈ f(x(a, b)) for all a ≤ b ≤ 1.
Proof of Theorem 3.7. We consider profile













By Lemma 3.8 and 3.9, any strategy-proof mechanism f





and 0, achieving a social cost of 1. However,
the optimal social cost for x̃ is only 1
2n
by placing facilities
at 0 and 1. This contradicts the assumption that f has an




Our lower bound is constructed in the line metric space,
which directly applies to other general metric spaces. It also
holds for any metric space which can be locally viewed as
a line, such as the circle. On the line, there is an upper
bound of n − 2, which asymptotically matches our lower
bound. However, this lower bound may not be tight for
more general metrics. For example, there is no known upper
bound for deterministic mechanisms in metric spaces other
than line and circle (to be shown in Section 5). It could be
the case that the approximation ratio is actually unbounded
for general metric spaces.
Our technique can be extended to show a linear lower
bound for the k-facility game when k > 2. It is unknown
whether this bound is tight even on the line. In particular,
it remains an open question that whether a deterministic
mechanism exists for three-facility games with any bounded
approximation ratio even in the line metric space.
4. PROPORTIONAL MECHANISM
In the previous section, we proved that there is no deter-
ministic strategy-proof mechanism with a good (sub-linear)
approximation ratio. In this section, we propose the first
randomized mechanism with a constant approximation ra-
tio. Notice that the best known randomized mechanism [17]
has an approximation ratio of n/2, and works only in the
line metric space. Our mechanism works for general metric
spaces.
Proportional Mechanism.
Given a profile x = (x1, x2, ..., xn), the locations of the two
facilities are decided by the following random process:
Round 1: Choose agent i uniformly at random from N .
The first facility l1 is placed at xi.
Round 2: Let dj = d(l1, xj) be the distance from agent j
to the first facility l1. Choose agent j with probability
dj∑
k∈N dk
. The second facility is then placed at xj.
3
The Proportional Mechanism always allocates facilities on
the reported locations. The probability of the placement of
the second facility is proportional to its distances to the first
facility. This is where the name “Proportional” comes from.
The Proportional Mechanism has the following nice prop-
erty. Every term in the expected cost has a form of X
Y
Z,
where X,Y, Z are some distances. X
Y
is a ratio which indi-
cates a probability, and Z is a cost. However, we can also
view Z
Y
as a ratio, and X as a cost. This small observation
is used extensively both in the proof of strategy-proofness
and the analysis of the approximation ratio.
4.1 Strategy-Proofness
Theorem 4.1. The Proportional Mechanism for the two-
facility game is strategy-proof.
Proof. We use costk(f(x), xi) to denote the expected
cost of the agent i conditional on that the first facility is at













Consider profile x′ = ⟨x′i,x−i⟩, in which agent i misre-
ports her location from xi to x
′
i. To prove the strategy-
proofness, it is sufficient to prove that for all k ̸= i,
costk(f(x
′), xi) ≥ costk(f(x), xi).
Now we fix the first facility on xk. We recall that di =
d(l1, xi) = d(xk, xi) and costk(f(x), xi) is∑n




j ̸=i dj min{di, d(xi, xj)}∑n
j=1 dj
.
Let d′i = d(l1, x
′
i). The cost of agent i if she misreports,
i.e. costk(f(x
′), xi) is∑
j ̸=i dj min{di, d(xi, xj)}∑n




d′i min{di, d(xi, x′i)}∑n















d′i min{di, d(xi, x′i)}∑n




If d′i ≤ di, the first term on the right hand side is already
greater than costk(f(x), xi), while the second term is non-
negative. Therefore we only need to consider the case that
d′i > di. We have,
costk(f(x
′), xi)− costk(f(x), xi)
=
−(d′i − di)costk(f(x), xi)∑n




d′i min{di, d(xi, x′i)}∑n




So it is sufficient to show that
d′i min{di, d(xi, x′i)} − (d′i − di)costk(f(x), xi) ≥ 0. (1)
We prove this for two cases.
3If all the agents report the same location, our mechanism
places the second facility also on this location.
• If min{di, d(xi, x′i)} = di, inequality (1) holds because
d′i ≥ d′i − di and di ≥ costk(f(x), xi). Here the latter
holds because agent i can at least choose the first facil-
ity, which is at xk, to serve him with cost d(xi, xk) =
di.
• If min{di, d(xi, x′i)} = d(xi, x′i), inequality (1) holds
because d′i ≥ di ≥ costk(f(x), xi) and d(xi, x′i) ≥ d′i −
di. Here the latter is due to the triangle inequality in
the metric space (Ω, d) since d′i = d(l1, x
′
i) and di =
d(l1, xi).
This completes the proof.
From the above proof, we can see that our Proportional
Mechanism is strategy-proof even in a slightly stronger sense.
An agent does not have the incentive to lie even if she has
seen the random bits in the first round of the mechanism.
4.2 Approximation Ratio for Social Cost
In this section, we estimate the approximation ratio of our
Proportional Mechanism in general metric spaces and prove
the following theorem.
Theorem 4.2. The approximation ratio of the Propor-
tional Mechanism for the two-facility game is at most 4 for
any metric space.
For a location profile x, let fα and fβ be the locations of
the two facilities in one optimal solution. Let α be the set
of agents that are strictly closer to fα than to fβ , and β be
the rest. We use OPTα to denote the summation of costs of
agents in α and OPTβ the summation of costs of agents in
β. Clearly, OPT = OPTα +OPTβ .
Similarly, let costα (resp. costβ) be the total costs of
agents in α (resp. β), assuming facilities are chosen accord-
ing to our Proportional Mechanism. Let Fα (resp. Fβ) be
the event that the agent chosen by the mechanism at the
first round is in α (resp. β). Since our mechanism is ran-
domized, both costα and costβ are random variables. We
need to bound the expected cost of our mechanism, which
is E[costα + costβ ]. Fα and Fβ are two exclusive random
events, which form a partition of the whole probabilistic
space. Therefore, the cost E[costα + costβ ] is equal to
Pr(Fα)E[(costα + costβ)|Fα] + Pr(Fβ)E[(costα + costβ)|Fβ ].
Next two lemmas bound the expected values E[(costα +
costβ)|Fα] = E[costα|Fα] + E[costβ |Fα]. Similar results can
be deduced for E[(costα + costβ)|Fβ ].
Lemma 4.3. E[costα|Fα] ≤ 2OPTα





if we completely ignore the second facility. Since OPTα =∑
i∈α d(xi, fα), by triangle inequality, we have |α| ·OPTα =∑












j∈α d(xi, xj). The lemma follows.





min{d(xk, xj), d(xi, xj)}
to be the cost of the agents in β given the condition that










Figure 2: Definitions of D, di and ei
Proportional Mechanism. We denote P (i|k) as the proba-
bility that the second chosen agent is i conditional on that














costk,iβ · P (i|k).
(2)
For first term in Eq.(2), we ignore the second facility and




























d(xk, xi) ≤ 2OPTα
(3)
where the last inequality is due to Lemma 4.3.
For the second term in Eq.(2), we will bound the internal
summation for any fixed k ∈ α. So we fixed the first facility
l1(= xk) and denote dj = d(l1, xj). As shown in Figure
2, we define D = d(l1, fβ) to be the distance between l1
and the optimal facility in β. Furthermore, for agent j in
β, let ej = d(fβ , xj) be the distance from agent j to the




Notice that sj can be negative by our definition. However,
we always have
∑
j∈β sj ≥ 0, since otherwise l1 is a strictly
better facility location for agents in β than fβ , contradicting
the optimality of fβ .
















j∈β ej + sj
∑
j∈β
min{ej + sj , d(xi, xj)}
 .
(4)
By triangle inequality, we have d(xi, xj) ≤ ej +ei, and we







j∈β ej + sj
∑
j∈β


























The first term of the last summation is exactly
∑
j∈β ej =
OPTβ . For the second term, we relax min{sj , ei} to sj . Be-
cause
∑
j∈β ej + sj ≥
∑
j∈β sj , the second term is bounded
by
∑
j∈β ej = OPTβ .
For the third term, we relax min{sj , ei} to ei. By triangle


















j∈β ej + sj
≤ 2OPTβ ,
(6)
where the last inequality is because (using the fact that∑
j∈β sj ≥ 0)∑
j∈β
2ej + 2sj ≥
∑
j∈β
2ej + sj =
∑
j∈β
dj + ej ≥ |β| ·D.
To put things together, we have∑
i∈β
costk,iβ P (i|k) ≤ 4OPTβ . (7)
Substituting Eq. (3) and Eq. (7) to Eq. (2), we have
E[costβ |Fα] ≤ 2OPTα+4OPTβ . This completes the proof.
We are ready to prove the main theorem of this section.
Proof of Theorem 4.2. The theorem follows by the fol-
lowing chain of inequalities.
E[costα + costβ ]
≤ max{E[(costα + costβ)|Fα],E[(costα + costβ)|Fβ ]}
= max{E[costα|Fα] + E[costβ |Fα],E[costα|Fβ ] + E[costβ |Fβ ]}
≤ max{2OPTα + 2OPTα + 4OPTβ ,
2OPTβ + 4OPTα + 2OPTβ}
= 4(OPTα +OPTβ) = 4OPT.
in which the bounds of E[costα|Fβ ] and E[costβ |Fβ ] are due
to the symmetric versions of Lemma 4.3 and Lemma 4.4.
4.3 Discussion
It is worth noting that this upper bound of 4 is tight for
our Proportional Mechanism even for the line metric space.
Consider the location profile x = (ϵ, 0, 0, ...0, 1), it can be
shown that its approximation ratio tends to 4 as the number
of agents is sufficiently large and ϵ → 0.
We note that the Proportional Mechanism is not group
strategy-proof. It would be interesting if one can find a
group strategy-proof mechanism with a constant approxi-
mation ratio.
We also examine two possible extensions of our Propor-
tional Mechanism to the three-facility game. The first is to
allocate the first two facilities the same as this section, but
the third one in some agent w.p. proportional to her min-
imal distance to the first two facilities. Unfortunately we
have found a non-trivial counter-example and shown that
this mechanism is not strategy-proof. 4
Another extension is a strategy-proof three-facility mech-
anism on the real line. The first two facilities are located
at the leftmost and the rightmost reported locations. For
the third facility, it is randomly chosen among the rest of
the agents w.p. proportional to their minimal distances to
the first two facilities. This mechanism guarantees a linear
approximation ratio.
5. MECHANISM FOR CIRCLE
In this section, we consider the circle metric space (S1, d),
where S1 ⊂ R2 is a circle in the two dimensional Euclidean
space and the distance d(x, y) for x, y ∈ S1 is the length of
the minor arc spanned by x and y. We can normalize the
circle so that its circumference is 1. Notice that the n−1
2
deterministic lower bound in Section 3 can still be applied
here, because a circle can be locally viewed as a line. Now we
give a deterministic group strategy-proof mechanism with an
approximation ratio of n− 1. This is tight up to a constant
factor of 2.
Circle Mechanism.
Given profile x = (x1, x2, ...xn), the first facility is allocated
at x1, the location of the first agent. As shown in Figure
3 (a), we denote x̂1 the antipodal of x1, and there form two
semi-circles with x1 and x̂1 as endpoints. We call one of the
semi-circle the left circle L and the other the right circle R
5. Let A and B be the set of agents on L and R respectively.
We assume agents at location x1 and x̂1 (if any) appear in
only A, and thus A ∩ B = ∅. Define dA = maxi∈A d(x1, xi)
and dB = maxi∈B d(x1, xi) (if B is empty, let dB = 0). We
allocate the second facility as follows:
• If dA < dB, facility l2 is placed on R with distance
min{max{dB , 2dA}, 1/2} to l1.
• If dA ≥ dB, facility l2 is placed on L with distance
min{max{dA, 2dB}, 1/2} to l1.
In this mechanism, the first facility is always allocated at
the location of the first agent as a dictator. Let us break
the circle at point x̂1 to make it a straight line and think
the location of first agent as the origin. In this way, we can
understand the intuition of the mechanism more clearly.
4This counter-example is as follows: there exist n0 agents at
location 0, n1 agents at location 1, n2 agents at location 1+x
and 1 agent at location 1+x+y. Here n0 is sufficiently large
such that we can assume the first facility l1 to be always
located at 0. In this configuration, let y = 100, x = 105,
n1 = 50 and n2 = 4. After a careful calculation one may
find out that the agent at location 1 may have the incentive
to misreport to location 1 + x.
5x1 and x̂1 are assumed to be in both L and R.
 
 




























Figure 3: Mechanism on the Circle
After breaking the circle into a line, the coordinate of
the rightmost (resp. leftmost) agent is dB(resp. −dA). If
the distance from the rightmost agent to the origin is larger
(dB > dA), we put the second facility on the right side at
location max{dB , 2dA}. Otherwise, we put the second fa-
cility on the left side at location −max{dA, 2dB}. We can
verify that the this line mechanism is group strategy-proof
and has a linear approximation ratio.
However, when we transfer it back to the circle case, the
location max{dB , 2dA} (resp. −max{dA, 2dB}) may go across
x̂1 to the left circle L (resp. right circle R), which breaks
the strategy-proofness. Therefore we put a cutoff at x̂1 for
the circle mechanism, which means that we allocate the sec-
ond facility at exactly x̂1 if max{dB , 2dA} is greater than 12
(resp. if −max{dA, 2dB} is smaller than −1/2).
In the following proof, we shall keep this line interpreta-
tion in mind. For example, we call the agent farthest from
l1 in A the leftmost agent and the agent farthest from l1 in
B the rightmost agent.
5.1 Group Strategy-Proofness
Theorem 5.1. The Circle Mechanism is group strategy-
proof.
Proof. We assume for contradiction that the Circle Mech-
anism f is not group strategy-proof. Then there exists a
profile x = (x1, x2, ...xn), a group of agents S ⊂ N and their
misreported locations x′S such that for every agent i ∈ S, it
is better off by the collusion, i.e.
cost(f(x′S ,x−S), xi) < cost(f(x), xi).
Without loss of generality, we assume dA ≥ dB for the given
profile x, and the case dA < dB is similar. So l2 lies on L in
f(x).
The cost for the first agent is 0 in f(x), so she cannot
reduce her cost by any means and hence 1 ̸∈ S. This tells us
that l1 is still located as x1 in f(x
′
S ,x−S), and we assume
f(x′S ,x−S) = {l1, l′2}. We denote by C1 the arc from l1 to
l2 in an anti clockwise direction and by C2 the arc from l1
to l2 in an clockwise direction. Then all agents in A are on
C1 and all agents in B are on C2.
Obviously, l′2 can not be at l1 or l2 because otherwise no
agent is better off. Therefore we have the following two
cases:
Case 1: l′2 ∈ C1. We first see that no agent in B can ben-
efit from this misreport, because for an agent in B,
either l1 or l2 will be her closer facility than the new
l′2. Therefore we have S ⊂ A and d′B ≥ dB .
Now, the colluded agents are all on C1, and to benefit
themselves, l′2 must still lie on C1 with d(l1, l
′
2) strictly
smaller than d(l1, l2). This happens only when d
′
A <
dA according to our mechanism because agents in B do
not lie. To have this, the leftmost agent in A must be
in S and lie. Call this agent xp. We cannot have l2 =
xp because otherwise agent p has already experienced
a zero cost and has no incentive to lie. So we have
l2 ̸= xp. In this case, we have
d(l1, l
′
2) ≥ min {2d′B , 1/2} ≥ min {2dB , 1/2} = d(l1, l2),
contradicting our assumption that d(l1, l
′
2) < d(l1, l2).
Case 2: l′2 ∈ C2. For similar reason as Case 1, no agent in
A can benefit from the misreport, and thus S ⊂ B. As
a result, d′A ≥ dA. We further discuss three subcases
regarding the location of l2 and l
′
2.








, we must have l′2 = l2 because agents in
A do not lie. No agent can benefit in this scenario.
If dB ≥ 14 , we have d
′
A ≥ dA ≥ dB ≥ 14 . To
benefit themselves, l′2 must lie on the right circle
R because all the colluded agents are in B. But
this cannot be the case since




Subcase 2.2: l2 ̸= x̂1 and l′2 is on L (including x̂1).
Since l2 ̸= x̂1, we have dB < 14 . So the distance
from any agent j ∈ B to l′2 is at least d(xj , l1)
because l′2 ∈ L. It is clear that any agent in B
cannot thus benefit because her closest facility is
still l1.
Subcase 2.3: l2 ̸= x̂1 and l′2 is on R (excluding x̂1).
Then we have dB <
1
4
and dA ≤ d′A < 14 . So for
any agent k ∈ B, d(xk, l′2) is at least 2d′A − dB ,
which is at least dB since dB ≤ dA ≤ d′A. This is
already larger than or equal to its distance to the
first facility which is dB . This is a contradiction.
The theorem follows.
5.2 Approximation Ratio for Social Cost
Theorem 5.2. The approximation ratio of the Circle Mech-
anism is at most n− 1.
Proof. For a given profile x, consider the optimal so-
lution using notations α and β defined in Section 4.2. We
denote Iα the minimal arc covering all agents in α, and Iβ
the minimal arc covering all agents in β. It can be easily
verified that Iα ∩ Iβ = ∅. Let |Iα| be the length of Iα and
|Iβ | be the length of Iβ . Obviously OPT ≥ |Iα|+ |Iβ |.
Without loss of generality, we assume l1 = x1 ∈ Iα and
dA ≥ dB , so the second facility l2 ∈ L according to our
mechanism.
Similar to Section 4.2, we let costα =
∑
i∈α cost(f(x), xi)
be the summation of costs of agents in α, and costβ =∑
i∈β cost(f(x), xi). It is clear that costα ≤ (|α| − 1)OPT,
because l1 ∈ Iα and any agent in α is at most |Iα| ≤ OPT
far from l1, except x1 = l1 itself who has zero cost. Next
we are to prove that costβ ≤ |β|OPT, which is enough to
show our n− 1 upper bound because cost = costα+costβ ≤
(n− 1)OPT.
If l2 ∈ Iβ , the distance from each agent in β to its closest
facility is at most |Iβ |. Thus, costβ ≤ |β||Iβ | ≤ |β|OPT.
If l2 ̸∈ Iβ , let p be the leftmost agent on L, and q be the
rightmost agent on R. We know that d(l1, xp) = dA and
d(l1, xq) = dB . If both xp, xq are in Iβ (Figure 3 (b)), we
will have a contradiction: according to the mechanism, l1
and l2 are on different arcs with xp and xq as endpoints, but
Iβ which contains both xp and xq must contain either l1 or
l2. This contradicts the assumption of l1 ∈ Iα or l2 ̸∈ Iβ
respectively. Therefore, at least one of xp ∈ Iα and xq ∈ Iα
hold.
• If xp ∈ Iα (Figure 3 (c)), |Iα| ≥ dA because both x1
and xp are in. But each agent in β is at most dB ≤ dA
far from l1. This implies
costβ ≤ |β|dA ≤ |β||Iα| ≤ |β|OPT
• If xp ̸∈ Iα, we have xq ∈ Iα (Figure 3 (d)). We have
|Iα| ≥ dB because both x1 and xq are in. So all agents
in β are located on L, and thus each agent in β is
no more than d(l1, l2)/2 far from either l1 or l2. Fur-
thermore, based on the facts of l2 ̸∈ Iβ and xp ∈ Iβ ,
we deduce that l2 ̸= xp. In this case, d(l1, l2) ≤ 2dB





≤ |β||Iα| ≤ |β|OPT.
This completes the proof.
5.3 Discussion
We remark here that the approximation ratio of the Circle
Mechanism cannot be improved. Consider the profile x =
(x1, x2, ..., xn), where d(x1, x2) = d(x1, x3) = 0.1 and x3 =
x4 = ... = xn. But x2 and x3 are on different sides of
x1. In this case, OPT = 0.1 but the mechanism will give
cost = 0.1(n− 1).
As noted, the mechanism here is motivated by the mecha-
nism on a line. We do not know a mechanism with a bounded
ratio for any slightly more complicated metric space. For ex-
ample, for a star with three branches, we do not know how
to extend our Circle Mechanism to this case. Furthermore,
we can prove that if we fix the first facility as a dictator, no
mechanism has a bounded ratio.
6. OPEN PROBLEMS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we summarize some open problems related
to this work.
1. The first remaining problem is to close the constant
gaps both for deterministic (between n − 2 and n−1
2
)
and randomized (between 4 and 1.045) mechanisms in
the line metric space.
2. It is interesting to explore deterministic mechanisms
for the general metric spaces or the special metric
spaces other than line or circle. To design a deter-
ministic mechanism with any bounded ratio would be
instructive. It is also possible that one can show that
the approximation ratio is actually unbounded.
3. As noted in the paper, our Proportional Mechanism is
not group strategy-proof. It remains open to provide
a group strategy-proof randomized mechanism with a
constant approximation ratio.
4. Another natural extension is to consider the game with
three or more facilities. Our linear lower bound for de-
terministic mechanisms can be easily extended to more
facilities. However, no deterministic mechanism with
any bounded ratio has been known yet even for the
line. It is significant if one can provide such a mecha-
nism or prove that it does not exist. For a randomized
setting, we can give a mechanism with a linear ap-
proximation ratio for the three-facility game in the line
metric space. It would be very interesting to explore
whether we can still get mechanisms with constant ap-
proximation ratio for games with more facilities.
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Appendix: Proof of Lemma 3.9
The lemma is obvious when a = 1. Consider Ib(a) for a < 1.
We first show that Ib(a) ∩ (a, 1) ̸= ∅.
If Ib(a) ∩ (a, 1) = ∅, we consider the profile x(a, a+12 ).
The cost for agents at location a+1
2
is at least 1−a
2
because





, while the optimal social cost is only 1−a
2
. This
contradicts the assumption that the approximation ratio of
f is smaller than n−1
2
. For such reason, there exists some
c0 ∈ Ib(a) ∩ (a, 1).
We then show that Ib(a) ∩ (a, 1) = (a, 1). Assume for
contradiction that there exists c ∈ (a, 1) satisfying c /∈ Ib(a).
Obviously, c ̸= c0.
 










Figure 4: The definition of c0, c, b∗ and b
∗
If c < c0 (Figure 4 (a)), we define b
∗ = infx∈Ib(a){x > c}.
Since Ib(a) is closed (Corollary 3.6), we have b
∗ ∈ Ib(a) and
a < c < b∗ ≤ c0 < 1.
According to definitions above, we have [c, b∗)∩ Ib(a) = ∅.
For any 0 ≤ ϵ < (b∗ − c)/2, the closest point to b∗ − ϵ in
the image set Ib(a) is b
∗ (this point is unique). Thus by







and consider the following profile:
x′ = (a, a, . . . , a︸ ︷︷ ︸
(n−1)/2
, b∗ − ϵ, b∗ − ϵ, . . . , b∗ − ϵ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(n−1)/2
, b∗).
Using the fact that b∗ ∈ f(x(b∗ − ϵ, b)) and Corollary 3.2,
we know b∗ ∈ f(x′). However, no matter where the second
facility is located by f , the social cost is at least (n−1)ϵ
2
,
contradicting that f has an approximation ratio smaller than
(n − 1)/2, since the optimal social cost in profile x′ is only
ϵ.
If c > c0 (Figure 4 (b)), we define b∗ = infx∈Ib(a){x < c}.
Since Ib(a) is closed, we have b∗ ∈ Ib(a) and a < c0 ≤ b∗ <=
c < 1.
According to definitions above, we have (b∗, c]∩ Ib(a) = ∅.
For any 0 ≤ ϵ < (c − b∗)/2, the closest point to b∗ + ϵ
in the image set Ib(a) is b∗ (this point is unique). Thus by




and consider the following profile:
x′′ = (a, a, . . . , a︸ ︷︷ ︸
(n−1)/2
, b∗ + ϵ, b∗ + ϵ, . . . , b∗ + ϵ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(n−1)/2
, b∗).
Using the fact that b∗ ∈ f(x(b∗ + ϵ, b)) and Corollary 3.2,
we know b∗ ∈ f(x′′). However, no matter where the second
facility is located by f , the social cost is at least (n−1)ϵ
2
,
contradicting that f has an approximation ratio smaller than
(n− 1)/2, since the optimal social cost in profile x′′ is only
ϵ.
To sum up, we just proved that Ib(a) ∩ (a, 1) = (a, 1).
According to Corollary 3.5, we have that b ∈ f(x(a, b)) for
all a ≤ b ≤ 1. For the case that b = a or b = 1 the result is
trivial.
